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Which of the democratic checks and balances - opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press -
is the most critical? Peru has the full set of democratic institutions. In the 1990s, the secret-
police chief Vladimiro Montesinos systematically undermined them all with bribes. We 
quantify the checks using the bribe prices. Montesinos paid television-channel owners about 
100 times what he paid judges and politicians. One single television channel’s bribe was four 
times larger than the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes. By revealed preference, the 
strongest check on the government’s power was the news media.  
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Of the checks and balances that underpin any democracy, which is the most 
critical?  Peru has in place the full set of democratic mechanisms:  a constitution, 
opposition parties, regular elections, a presidential term limit, safeguards for the 
independence of the judiciary, and a free press.  In the 1990s, Peru was run, in the name 
of President Alberto Fujimori, by its secret-police chief, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres.  
In the course of exercising power, Montesinos methodically bribed judges, politicians, 
and the news media.   
Montesinos kept meticulous records of his transactions.  He required those he 
bribed to sign contracts detailing their obligations to him.  He demanded written receipts 
for the bribes (see Figure 1).  Strikingly, he had his illicit negotiations videotaped.     
In what follows we use Montesinos’s bribe receipts and videotapes to study the 
breakdown of checks and balances.  Montesinos and Fujimori maintained the façade of 
democracy—the citizens voted, judges decided, the media reported—but they drained its 
 substance.  How did they go about undermining democracy?  We discuss the workings of 
covert authoritarianism:  the negotiation and enforcement of the secret deals.   
We use the bribe prices to quantify the checks and balances.  The size of the 
bribes indicates how much Montesinos was willing to pay to buy off those who could 
have checked his power.  (See Tables 2, 3, and 4 below.)  The typical bribe paid to a 
television-channel owner was about a hundred times larger than that paid to a judge, 
which was about the same as that paid to a politician.  One single television channel’s 
bribe was four times larger than the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes.  The most 
forceful of all the checks and balances on the Peruvian government’s power, by 
Montesinos’s revealed preference, was television. 
 
1.  The Montesinos Virus 
 
Democratic institutions form a system of incentives shaping and constraining the 
government’s behavior.  Most analyses of the checks and balances examine them 
separately:  the independent judiciary (La Porta et al., 2004), political parties (Persson et 
al., 1997), and the news media (Besley and Prat, 2001; Djankov et al., 2003b).  The parts 
of the system interact, however.  A pair of governance mechanisms may be 
complementary, in the sense that one works better when the other is in place, or 
strengthening one increases the marginal effectiveness of the other (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990).  Opposition politicians are more potent, for example, the freer the press.  
The checks and balances reinforce each other. 
The number of countries that are democratic has jumped.  In the mid-1970s, there 
were 39 electoral democracies; by 2001 there were 104 (Diamond, 2002, p. 26).  Along 
with this shift has come an increase in the number of countries that are imperfectly 
democratic, having the form of democracy but falling short on the substance.  Not only 
Peru under Fujimori, but also countries like Russia under Vladimir Putin, Zimbabwe 
under Robert Mugabe, Malaysia under Mahathir Mohamed, Haiti under Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, and Mexico before Ernesto Zedillo have, or had, a competitive authoritarian 
regime.  Under competitive authoritarianism, as defined by Levitsky and Way (2002, p. 
  252), formal democratic institutions operate, but the incumbent violates the rules to such 
an extent that “the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.”       
The “Montesinos virus” is a more vivid label for it, coined by the Polish journalist 
and former democracy activist Adam Michnik (2000):  “a newly discovered cancerous 
disease found most commonly in contemporary democratic states.”  With standard 
authoritarianism becoming harder to sustain because of globalization and new 
communications technologies, competitive authoritarianism has become more common 
around the world.  Twenty-one competitive authoritarian regimes existed as of 2001, by 
the count of Diamond (2002), all of them in developing or ex-communist countries. 
  Understanding the ways in which democratic institutions can be subverted—
where the weak points are and how the parts of the system interact with each other—
might be useful in designing governance systems elsewhere that are less corruptible.  
Montesinos’s bribes reveal which of the checks is the hardest to undermine.   
 
2.  Lies and Videotape   
 
In 1990, Fujimori, a political novice, was elected president of Peru, a country in 
turmoil.  Economic mismanagement had brought hyperinflation and negative growth.  An 
insurgency driven by the Shining Path, a murderous band of Maoist guerillas, would by 
its end bring 69,000 deaths.
2   
Fujimori appointed Montesinos his advisor and ad hoc head of the Servicio de 
Intelligencia Nacional (SIN, the national intelligence service).  Montesinos had had a 
checkered career.  Starting out as an army officer, he had been expelled from the army on 
charges of selling secret documents to the United States; then in the 1980s he had been a 
lawyer for Colombian drug dealers.  He made good use of the connections he had forged 
in his time in the military, obtaining his influence by serving as a bridge between a weak 
military and a weak president, says Peruvian political analyst Umberto Jara (2003, p. 38).  
He was “the nexus capable of uniting two weaknesses:  an army that had lost its prestige 
because of subversion and human rights violations, and a political unknown, absolutely 
                                                           
2   The 69,000 estimate is from the 2003 report of the government-appointed Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Juan Forero, “Peru Report Says 69,000 Died in 20 Years of Rebel War,” New York Times, 
August 29, 2003, p. A3).   
  3solitary, without a political organization or a social base.”  According to his biographers 
Sally Bowen and Jane Holligan (2003, p. 127), Montesinos used to boast that he could 
manipulate the president, saying Fujimori “is completely malleable:  he does nothing at 
all without my knowing it.”   
 Fujimori claimed two major early successes:  ending the terrorist insurrection and 
sparking economic growth.  The Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, was captured in 
1992, and then thousands of his followers.  An influx of foreign investment followed 
economic reforms, with deregulation and privatization and a successful anti-inflation 
program (bringing inflation down from 7,540 percent in 1990 to 10.5 percent in 1995:  
Marcus-Delgado and Tanaka, 2001).  As a result, whereas from 1981 to 1990 annual 
growth had averaged –1.2 percent, from 1991 to 2000 it averaged 4.0 percent.  However, 
the government became increasingly repressive.  Mario Vargas Llosa, the novelist who 
had been the losing presidential candidate in 1990, noted, “Fujimori was very popular. 
Though dirty things were going on—torture, killings and corruption—his image was of a 
strongman who would defend people against the terrorists.”
3   
  An assault on democracy came in 1992, when Fujimori mounted a self-coup 
(autogolpe), closing the Congress and suspending the constitution.  He decreed laws 
specifying harsh sentences for terrorists, trying some of them in secret courts with judges 
hooded to protect them from reprisals.  Democracy returned, at least superficially, with 
an election in 1995, which Fujimori won.  In May 2000, Fujimori won re-election to a 
third term.  In order to run, he had to persuade the Congress to override the presidential 
term limit.  The election was widely regarded as rigged. 
Just three and a half months after the election, the Fujimori government fell, after 
one of Montesinos’s videotapes was broadcast on television.  Montesinos was seen 
paying opposition politician Alberto Kouri US$15,000 per month to switch sides and 
support the president.  Other videotapes subsequently were broadcast, becoming Peru’s 
own distinctive form of reality television.  The tapes, which came to be called the 
vladivideos, revealed the breadth of Vladimiro Montesinos’s reach.  They showed him, 
for example, offering Alipio Montes de Oca, a Supreme Court Justice, the presidency of 
the National Elections Board plus an extra $10,000 monthly salary, medical care, and 
                                                           
3   Maya Jaggi, “Fiction and Hyper-Reality,” Guardian, March 16, 2002.   
  4personal security; bribing Ernesto Gamarra, a member of a congressional committee 
investigating Montesinos’s sources of money, to direct the investigation away from 
Montesinos; and assuring the owner of Lucchetti, a Chilean pasta company, of a 
favorable judgment in a legal dispute over the construction of a factory.  Over 1,600 
Peruvians were found to have been in the Montesinos network.   
Montesinos and Fujimori fled the country.  Fujimori obtained asylum in Japan, 
from where he resigned the presidency by fax.  Montesinos was arrested in Venezuela, 
despite having altered his appearance with plastic surgery, and returned to Peru to be 
charged not only with corruption but also with murder, arms running, and drug dealing.   
The total number of vladivideos remains a mystery.  Initial reports suggested 
there were about 2,000.  From jail, Montesinos claimed to have more than 30,000.  Many 
Peruvians believe that when Fujimori fled he took several hundred.  A room in Peru’s 
Congress houses more than 1,600, only a fraction of which have been made public.  
Transcripts of some are available on the Congress’s website.
4  It is impossible to obtain a 
complete picture of what went on inside SIN, but much has emerged as more videos have 
become available and the judicial process has advanced.  We collected additional 
information from journalistic, legal, and academic sources in Peru.  Our data cover events 
in the final three years of the Fujimori regime, 1998 to 2000, when Montesinos’s main 
goal was get Fujimori reelected for a third term.   
While it may seem peculiar that Montesinos taped meetings where he was the 
corruptor, there is logic to it.  By videotaping his negotiations, Montesinos had proof of 
the others’ complicity.  He made sure the videos recorded the bribe-takers accepting his 
cash.  (See Figure 2.)  One vladivideo shows Montesinos pulling wads of bills from a 
plastic bag and putting them into a briefcase.  Another shows him beginning to count the 
money:  “And now comes the good stuff.  One, two, three, four, five, six.”  His 
counterpart said, “Here there is a million.  Better this other little briefcase, no?” 
Montesinos replied, “Which one?  No, no, this is great because you can close it … You 
can keep it as a gift.  Look:  one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, a 
million.  One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, two million.”
5  Also, 
                                                           
4 Congress website:  http://200.37.159.14/SICR/diariodebates/audiovideos.NSF/indice.   
5 Video 1349-50 “Meeting Dr.-Crousillat-Gisela” 26 February 1999.  Jochamowitz 2002, p. 13, and Video 
1780 “Calmell-Vicente-General Delgado ” undated. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 24. 
  5Montesinos told some people he was taping their meetings.  On one occasion he said, “It 
is already filmed.”  On another, his interlocutor asked, “Do you have that recorded?” and 
he responded in the affirmative.
6  In the event that the whole network collapsed, the tapes 
gave him a threat he could use against anyone who may have turned against him.   
 
3.  The Bribes 
 
  Montesinos had various sources for his bribe money.  The SIN budget, which was 
secret and unsupervised by the Congress, increased from 1990 to 2000 by 50 or 60 times.  
By 2000, it was about $1.5 million per month, of which about a quarter went to 
operational costs, salaries, etc., leaving about $1.1 million for Montesinos to spend.  He 
was not required to justify how he spent it.  In addition, he received under-the-table sums 
via the Ministry of the Interior and the military (see Table 1).  By 2000, he was getting 
about $750,000 in unrecorded cash from these other government agencies.  These add up 
to close to $2 million per month in government money.  Further, he siphoned money 
from state contracts.  When he needed more, he requested contributions from his 
accomplices in arms deals and other illegal businesses.  According to his bookkeeper, 
Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, by 2000 money was flowing into the SIN at a rate of $8 million to 
$9 million per month.
7  Money was not short.  After Montesinos’s arrest, more than $300 
million was traced in overseas bank accounts linked to him. 
  The bribe prices of politicians are in Table 2.  The politicians’ bribes are mostly 
between $5,000 and $20,000 per month.  (Compare these sums with a congressman’s 
official monthly pay, which in 1995 was about $4,500 plus $4,500 for expenses:  
Pollarolo, 2001.)  In addition to monthly payments, Montesinos sometimes made one-
time payments of up to $100,000, calling them campaign contributions, though since the 
money came from his SIN budget they were not conventional campaign money.  One 
outlier is Rodriguez Aguillar, who got $50,000 per month.  According to Montesinos, 
“the conversations with the lady [Rodriguez] were slower, they lasted more or less three 
                                                           
6 Video 866 “Alex-Absalón-Luz and Dr” 15 January 1998. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 46, and Video 1312 
“Meeting Dr. – Patricio Rickets” 12 January 1998.   
7 The data on Montesinos’s money sources come from Bowen and Holligan (2003, pp. 272-273, 326-327) 
and Rospigliosi (2000, p. 201). 
  6weeks, because she is a difficult person, and because her husband, who is the mayor of 
Piura, was always counseling her.”  The bribe was higher than usual, it seems, because 
she was a good bargainer and because two politicians came for the price of one.   
  Bribes went not only to opposition congressmen but also to Fujimori’s cabinet.  A 
prominent example is Federico Salas, Fujimori’s last prime minister, who confessed to 
accepting an extra salary from Montesinos of $30,000 per month.
8  While it may seem 
odd that Fujimori felt a need to pay off his own allies, perhaps this is a symptom of 
Peru’s politics being driven not by ideology or policy but by distributional issues.  
  The congressmen’s deals were consummated in April and May of 2000:  that is, 
during the run-up to the presidential election.  Montesinos made an initial payment 
immediately upon signing, then monthly payments, the signing payment usually, but not 
always, being the same amount as the monthly one.  Each of these congressmen signed 
three documents:  a receipt for the bribe; a letter asking Fujimori to admit him or her into 
Fujimori’s party, Peru 2000; and, on congressional letterhead paper, a compromiso de 
honor (a promise on one’s honor, a gentleman’s agreement).  An example of a 
compromiso de honor (in English translation) is in Appendix 1.  Congressman Mario 
Gonzalez Inga agrees to switch to Peru 2000 for a duration of five years, the length of a 
congressional term.  He promises to “act in close collaboration” with Montesinos, from 
whom he will “directly receive instructions.” 
  Bribes going to judges are in Table 3.  Their level is about the same as for 
politicians, though with a wider range.  The bribe price for ordinary judges was $2,500 to 
$10,000 per month (that is, between one-and-a-half times and six times their official 
salaries).  Supreme Court judges got bribes of around $25,000 per month, and the 
president of the Supreme Court got $35,000 (that is, three to four times their official 
salaries).
9  Justices on the National Elections Board, making decisions that directly 
affected Fujimori’s power, got $45,000 to $50,000.  The General Manager of the 
Judiciary, who managed the budget and the day-to-day running of the judiciary and kept 
the register of verdicts, got the largest bribe among the judiciary, $55,000 per month.   
                                                           
8  BBC News, “Peru’s ex-PM to Face Investigation,” 12/2/00, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1050950.stm 
9   Official salary data are from La República, March 16, 2004. 
  7  Bribes of the news media are in Table 4.  The director of Expreso, a broadsheet 
newspaper, received a lump sum of $1 million, ostensibly so he could buy a controlling 
block of the newspaper’s shares.  El Tio, a tabloid newspaper, got an incentive contract, 
being paid over about two years a reported total of $1.5 million based on content:  $3,000 
to $4,000 for a front-page headline, $5,000 for a full page article, and $500 for a shorter 
article.  Other tabloids like El Chato, El Chino, La Chuchi, El Mañanero, and El Diario 
Más, according to Conaghan (2002, p. 118), received similar deals.   
  Some newspapers like La República and El Comercio and some magazines like 
Caretas courageously continued to criticize the government despite being harassed,  
reporting for example on abuses in the lead-up to the 2000 election.  The harassment 
ranged from libel suits to arbitrary detention to death threats (Conaghan, 2002, p. 116; 
Schmidt, 2001, pp. 2-3).  The readers of these newspapers and magazines tended to be 
the more educated and affluent Peruvians.  The tabloids read by the majority of Peruvians 
were mostly under Montesinos’s control.   
  In an attempt to discredit the journalists who dared investigate the government, 
the tabloids carried hundreds of stories defaming them with bizarre labels:  “a mental 
midget,” “a she devil,” “undercover terrorist,” “paid coup provocateur.”  A headline in El 
Chino proclaimed three journalists “the rabid animals of the anti-Peruvian press.”
10 
  Among television channels, one was state-owned, Channel 7, and Montesinos had 
control over its content.  The five privately-owned television broadcasters, Channels 2, 4, 
5, 9, and 13, were bought off, as was a cable service, CCN.  One alone offered 
independent investigative journalism:  the other cable channel, Channel N, owned by El 
Comercio.  (It was on this channel that the Kouri videotape that brought everything down 
was first aired).  Its monthly fee putting it outside the budget of most Peruvians, however, 
its viewership was only in the tens of thousands (Bowen and Holligan, 2003, pp. 332-37).  
  Channel 4, with the largest viewership, got $1.5 million per month in bribes, and 
Channel 2 got $500,000 per month.  Channel 5 got a similar sum.  The other two 
channels, with smaller viewerships, received payoffs via share purchases and other 
                                                           
10  Jorge Salazar Cussiánovich, “The ‘Devils’ of the Peruvian Press,” Pulso del Periodismo, September 12, 
1999, http://www.pulso.org/English/Archives/Devils%20of%20Peruvian%20Press.htm. 
  8business deals and judicial favors.  Compare these numbers with the cost of bribing the 
politicians to get a majority in Congress:  in total this was less than $400,000 per month. 
  The contract between Montesinos and Channel 2 is in Appendix 2 (in English 
translation).  In the contract, Montesinos purchases full control over news broadcasts for 
a monthly payment of US$500,000.  The channel agrees to allow Montesinos to review 
each day’s news programs before they air, and not to broadcast anything about 
presidential or congressional candidates, or any program referring “explicitly or 
implicitly to political issues,” without Montesinos’s written approval.   
  The contract is presented as a legal document.  Montesinos, who held the sole 
copy, is not named, but just called the “Contractor.”  The contract adds that this “does not 
however nullify the legal value of this document” (oddly, since it clearly had no legal 
value at all).  At the start of each month, Montesinos is to pay Channel 2 its half-million 
dollars.  At the same time, the channel is to give him a letter of credit equal to this 
amount, which he will destroy after the channel fulfils its duties.  If he is late with a 
payment he incurs a penalty of 1 percent per day, rising to 5 percent after seven days.  
Montesinos’s contractual duties include, “To do whatever else is necessary.”  If the 
channel ever fails to act as agreed, Montesinos may resolve the matter without the 
channel “having any right to complain in any way.”   
The videos show Montesinos crowing about his control of the media.  “Each 
channel takes, damn, $2 million monthly, but it is the only way, that is why, damn, we 
have won, because we have sacrificed in this way.”  Talking to some associates about the 
television owners, he said, “We have made them sign on paper and all.  Now we are 
playing with something very serious.  They are all lined up.  Every day at 12:30 pm I 
have a meeting with them . . . We plan what is going to be aired in the evening news.”  At 
one point, Montesinos even offered the owner of one of the television channels a team of 
SIN agents who could work for him as an “investigative unit.”
11 
The cash payments underestimate Montesinos’s bribes, for he channeled further 
money to the newspapers and television by means of government advertising.  The state 
                                                           
11 Quotes from, respectively, Video 1792 “Meeting of high-ranking officers from the military forces, the 
Winter brothers, Carlos Boloña Behr and Vladimiro Montesinos Torres” 26 November 1999. Jochamowitz 
2002, p. 17; Audio 1736 “Meeting Dr.-Eduardo Calmell” 14 September 1999; and Audio B-139 “A-4” 
undated. 
  9became Peru’s biggest advertiser, with spending increasing by 52 percent from 1997 to 
1999.  Also, in 1999, the government decided to permit media outlets with outstanding 
taxes to work off their tax obligations by carrying free advertisements for the government 
health agency.  In addition, companies with which Montesinos had side deals were asked 
to advertise in particular media outlets as a way of supporting Fujimori’s reelection 
(Bresani, 2003; Degregori, 2000; Schmidt, 2001).   
Cash was not all that Montesinos used to sway people.  Favors were common:  
promotions, judicial string-pulling, support in election campaigns, and congressional 
votes (Moreno Ocampo, 2003).  Sometimes what was exchanged was a mere promise of 
undefined future favors.  After agreeing to a request from a television-channel owner, for 
example, Montesinos said, “You give me the difficult tasks.”  His interlocutor replied, 
“But, of course, in return I am at your disposal for anything you like.”    
The television channels received various favors.  Montesinos helped Channel 5 
maneuver a difficult lawsuit by interceding with the judiciary.  To support the owner of 
the cable channel CCN, he arranged the purchase of shares in his company by the 
Military Police pension fund.  He arranged a complex deal involving Channel 2, Channel 
4, and Peru’s second-largest bank, Wiese Sudameris Bank.  The two channels owed the 
bank $13 or $14 million.  Montesinos persuaded the bank’s managing director to 
refinance their debts.  In return, he resolved a tax problem for the banker.
12   
Judges and politicians also got noncash bribes, such as a car or a house.  A judge 
on the National Elections Board, Rómulo Muñoz Arce, negotiated jobs for his wife and 
son as well payment for his daughter’s education in the United States.  Montesinos threw 
in a first-class airfare for her, exclaiming, when the judge remarked on this, “First class?  
Of course I wouldn’t send her coach!”
13 
  Montesinos exerted control not only by bribery but sometimes by blackmail.  He 
would obtain video proof of sexual indiscretions and use these tapes for persuasion.  
Some were filmed in a brothel where SIN agents had installed hidden cameras.  (After he 
                                                           
12 Respectively Audio 896 “Julio Vera Gutierrez and Vladimiro Montesinos” 20 January 1998, and Video 
1790 “Eugenio Bertini” 10 November 1999.  
13  Video 1318. 
  10was imprisoned, the judges handed dozens of these videos over to the Roman Catholic 
Church, to be returned to those featured in them.)
14 
  As a last resort, Montesinos had the option of silencing a television channel if it 
refused to fall into line.  He did it once and the episode is revealing.  Frecuencia Latina, 
or Channel 2, was majority-owned by Baruch Ivcher, a naturalized Peruvian citizen of 
Israeli origin.  After initially being loyal to the government, in 1997 the channel began 
broadcasting investigative reports: one on SIN agents being tortured for talking about 
SIN to the press; another on Montesinos’s tax returns, showing his income far exceeded 
his government salary.  In retaliation, the Interior Ministry stripped Ivcher of his 
citizenship.  As a noncitizen he was not permitted, by law, to own a television channel.  
A tame judge assigned the channel’s ownership to minority shareholders beholden to 
Montesinos.  Thereafter, Frecuencia Latina broadcast Fujimori propaganda.  (Ivcher later 
told a US reporter that, six months before being stripped of his citizenship, he had been 
offered and declined a $19 million bribe, in return for which the government would have 
had veto over the content of news programs.
15) 
  The Ivcher episode shows the severity with which Montesinos punished 
defection.  Ivcher lost his citizenship, his company, and much of his wealth.  The episode 
shows, also, that retribution was costly to the government.  Ivcher’s harassment prompted 
noisy demonstrations in Lima.  The Peruvian Bishop’s Conference denounced Ivcher’s 
citizenship revocation as “illegal and dangerous.”  Overseas, as well, there was fallout.  
The US House of Representatives, citing the Ivcher case, issued a resolution condemning 
Peru’s interference with the freedom of the press.
16  The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held a hearing on the Ivcher case, after which Fujimori withdrew Peru from the 
court’s jurisdiction.  Fujimori bore some costs to silence a television channel, and thus 
the television channels had bargaining power.         
 
                                                           
14   Alistair Scrutton, “Peru Bishops to Get Custody of ‘Intimate’ Spy Tapes,” Reuters, February 21, 2001. 
15 Tyler Bridges, “Peruvian Broadcaster Returns from Exile, Fights for TV Station,” Miami Herald, March 
30, 2002 
16  H.Res. 57, October 4, 1999. The text of it is at http://usembassy.state.gov/lima/wwwshou.shtml. 
  114.  Why Television?  
  
The checks and balances are complementary.  Each check reinforces the others; 
the absence of one impairs the others.  Without judicial independence, the media are 
weakened.  For example, a compliant judge aided the clampdown on the media when he 
ratified the expropriation of Ivcher’s television channel.  Without judicial independence, 
also, political competition is enfeebled.  For example, the judges on the National 
Elections Board overrode the constitution to allow Fujimori to stand for a third term.  
Without political competition, judicial independence is at risk.  For example, upon 
suspending Congress in the 1992 self-coup, Fujimori was able to gain control over the 
judges.  With a compromised press, political competition is enfeebled.  A vladivideo 
shows Montesinos speaking of a press conference of opposition presidential candidate 
Alberto Andrade:  “No television channel aired the press conference. It never existed.”   
This chain of complementarities means that checks and balances form an all-or-
nothing package.  If one is weak, all are weak.  In this sense, each of the checks is vital.  
Nevertheless, the bribes differed, television being the most expensive check to 
undermine.  In this sense, television was the crucial constraint.  Why?   
  A straightforward explanation for why the television owners were more expensive 
to bribe than the politicians and judges is simply that they were richer.  The judges’ 
bribes were one-and-a-half times to four times their official salaries.  The politicians’ 
bribes were multiples of their official income.  By contrast, a few thousand dollars a 
month may not have impressed a wealthy television-channel owner.  However, this does 
not seem to be the complete explanation.  Indeed, an argument has been made in the 
opposite direction.  The television channels were heavily indebted, and this is said to be 
the reason they were ready to accept Montesinos’s bribes (Conaghan, 2002).  Had they 
been more financially secure, they would have been even harder to bribe.     
The explanation for why television is different must go deeper.  We offer two 
complementary explanations.  First, a television channel has more bargaining power than 
a politician or a judge.  Second, television is part of a constraining mechanism that is 
arguably more fundamental than the politicians or the judges.  
  12  To form a winning coalition in the Congress, Montesinos had to bribe only some 
of the opposition politicians.  The Congress has 120 members.  In 2000, Fujimori’s party 
Peru 2000 won 51 seats.  Fujimori thus needed ten more votes for a bare majority.  
Montesinos bribed twelve congressmen to change parties and join Fujimori’s, so he had 
two more than the minimum he needed for a majority.  He did not stop there, however.  
He bought five more congressmen, but asked them not to switch but instead to remain in 
their own parties and act as his informants.  Montesinos had calculated, evidently, that he 
needed to buy only 17 of the 69 opposition congressmen. 
  Similarly, Montesinos had to bribe only some of the judges.  In 1995, Fujimori 
had enacted what he called judicial “reform,” which reduced judicial independence by 
setting up “provisional” judges, who could be dismissed by the government.  By 1997, 73 
percent of the judiciary had been shifted to provisional status (Hernandez Breña, 2003).  
The lack of secure tenure made these judges susceptible to pressure.  In the lower courts, 
Montesinos had some power to allocate judges to cases, so he could assign a friendly 
judge to a sensitive case (García Calderón, 2001, p. 49; World Bank, 2001a, paragraph 8-
23).  In the Supreme Court, decisions are made by majority vote, so three of the five 
Supreme Court judges were enough.   
Given that not all of the judiciary was bought, why did the remaining honest 
judges not expose the corrupt ones?  Again, it comes down to the interlinkages among the 
checks and balances.  With the news media captured, it would have been difficult for the 
honest judges to get a hearing, and Montesinos could have slandered the whistleblowers 
so as to discredit them. 
  With television, by contrast, Montesinos had to bribe all of the widely watched 
channels.  If he had succeeded in bribing all bar one, that renegade channel could harm 
him unilaterally (Besley and Prat, 2001).  Television channels were limited in number 
and, as the Ivcher case shows, costly to shut down even for a ruthless government.   
A television channel, therefore, had bargaining power.  By contrast, given that the 
supply of corruptible politicians and judges exceeded Montesinos’s limited demand, the 
politicians and judges had little bargaining power, so their price, as the data show, was 
relatively low.  The bargaining game of Stole and Zwiebel (1996) fits this situation.  The 
equilibrium of this game, applied here, has Montesinos buying a few more politicians 
  13than the minimum he needs.  Having extra politicians on hand means no individual’s vote 
could be crucial, so none of them individually has hold-up power over him.  (This result 
was also obtained by Groseclose and Snyder, 1996.)  As noted, Montesinos did in fact 
bribe more politicians than he needed for a congressional majority.  With judges it is the 
same story.  He pays the judges and politicians a little more than their fallback, the value 
they attach to their reputations.  The news outlets individually have hold-up power, 
regardless of how many of them he has bought already.  Thus the rest of the surplus (the 
value to Montesinos of absolute control minus what he pays judges and politicians) 
would be, according to the Stole-Zwiebel model, divided between Montesinos and the 
news media.  The media’s bribes would be a sizeable portion of the surplus.    
The second, distinct reason why television’s bribes were high in addition to hold-
up power, we argue, is that the size of a bribe reflected Montesinos’s perception of how 
much was at stake.  This was highest with television. 
The ultimate constraint on any democratic government is not an independent 
judiciary or opposition politicians or the constitution:  it is the citizenry as a whole.  The 
citizens have a stake in ensuring that the government maintains the institutions of 
democracy.  If a large number are able to react to any government violation of the rules, 
they effectively pre-empt such violations.  The citizens’ credible threat to depose the 
government makes the constitution self-enforcing.  As Weingast (1997) points out, 
however, they face a coordination problem in establishing the rule of law.  They are 
effective in concert, not alone.  As in any coordination game, any one citizen’s best 
action depends on what she believes the others will do.  It pays her to react to the 
government’s violation only if she expects that many others will react too.  Although in 
Weingast’s model the coordination problem is exacerbated by differences in interests 
among the citizens, a prior source of coordination difficulties is a lack of information.   
If our hypothetical citizen realizes the others are unaware of the government’s 
transgression, it will not be in her interest to act alone.  Merely not knowing whether the 
others know—a lack of common knowledge—is enough to foil coordinated action.  By 
informing everyone about the government’s violation of the rules, and informing 
everyone that everyone knows, television helps solve the citizens’ coordination problem.  
Broadcast over television, the transgression becomes common knowledge. 
  14This logic harks back to the view of philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn that, in 
the separation-of-powers scheme, the citizens play a crucial role.  The First Amendment 
to the US Constitution, which juxtaposes the freedom of the press and of assembly, is a 
statement not of individual rights but of self-government by an informed citizenry.  Its 
purpose is that “whatever truth may become available shall be placed at the disposal of 
all the citizens of the community” (Meiklejohn, 1960, p. 75).  In a democracy, “it is not 
enough that the truth is known by someone else . . . The voters must have it, all of them.” 
The difference, then, between the news media and the other checks and balances 
is that television, informing the citizenry, can bring forth the ultimate sanction of citizen 
reactions.  In the absence of the citizens’ oversight, there would be little to prevent the 
government from buying off politicians and judges.     
The difference between television and the print media is in their reach.  That the 
bribes paid to print newspapers were lower than to the television channels reflects the fact 
that far more Peruvians get their news from television than the press.  Television aerials 
sprout from the poorest of Lima’s shanty towns; some 95 percent of Lima households 
own a television set.  The largest-selling newspapers were the serious El Comercio, with 
a readership of some 600,000, and the sensationalist Ojo, with some 300,000 (Schmidt, 
2001, p. 13).  These readers were a small fraction of broadcast-television viewership, 
most of Peru’s 28 million people.      
  
5.  Doing Secret Deals 
 
  To evade the democratic checks and balances, Montesinos ran a massive covert 
operation.  His web of transactions, with more than 1,600 people, had to be carried out in 
secrecy.  How did he manage his network? 
“The addiction to information is like the addiction to drugs,” Montesinos 
declared.  He considered information the basis of his power.  “Here you feel the need for 
information… We live on information.  I need information.”  He tapped the telephones of 
enemies and of allies.  On a wall of his SIN office, 25 television screens showed scenes 
beamed live from hidden cameras in the presidential palace, the Congress, the courts, 
downtown Lima, and the airport.  Information was needed to identify opportunities and to 
  15ensure deals were kept.  He carefully monitored the media’s news reports to verify that 
the owners did comply with what they had agreed.  He explained to one of the television 
owners: “I have the monitoring on 24 hours; 24 hours they are transcribing for me.  I 
have the summary of what airs . . . I measure the time and I monitor the characters and at 
the end I summarize the day:  how much they devoted to this activity, how much to that 
one, how much in favor, how much against.”
17 
Although Montesinos sometimes required those he bribed to sign formal written 
contracts, such as that in the appendix, his contracting was not supportable by the courts 
and had to be self-enforcing.  How did he structure his deals so as to create incentives for 
his respondents to live up to them? 
Montesinos tried to prevent defection by cultivating camaraderie.  To a media-
company director he said, “The important thing, brother, is that … we all make a team . . 
. and damn, we support each other.”  Again: “We are all here a homogeneous work 
team.”  And again: “There is a feeling, because you are my kind, there is a chemistry of 
friendship.”  What united the network’s members, he liked to say, was something bigger 
than their self-interest.  “How do friends help friends? . . . Not to say that: hey, I give you 
this so that you do this.”  Again: “When one works in a team, one does not work for 
oneself.”
18  We can only guess what those he was speaking to must have made of this 
ruthless man’s avowals of fellowship. 
Camaraderie aside, when Montesinos asked people to sign documents for him, he 
would, in secret, verify their signatures by checking them against the signatures on their 
national identity cards.  No one tried to cheat him in this way, though. 
His position as secret-police chief endowed Montesinos with some enforcement 
powers.  However, he maintained he tried to avoid using violence, as he considered it too 
                                                           
17 Respectively, Videos 872-3 “Meeting Alex Kouri-Dr.” 26 January 1998. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 55; 
Videos 1347-8 “Meeting Dr. Crousillat Gisela” 26 February 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 55; and Video 
1677-1679 “Meeting Dr. –Delgado Parker-Schutz” 25 August 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 49.  On the 
television screens:  Bowen and Holligan (2003, p. 266). 
18 Respectively, Video 1783 “Dr. Schutz” 10 November 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 27; Video 1575 
Meeting of Mr. Vladimiro Montesinos Torres with Dionisio Romero Seminario, the General Saucedo 
Sanchez, General Fernando Dianderas Ottone, Almirant Ibárcena Amico, General Villanueva Ruesta and 
General Bello Vasquez 14 June 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 47; Videos 1291-1292 “Meeting Dr. Joy Way-
Cuculiza” 5 January 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 153; Video 1492 “Meeting Dr. Eduardo Calmell” 21 
April 1999. Jochamowitz 2002, p. 153; and Video 1323-6 “Meeting Montesinos Juan M. Guillen, 
Arequipa’s Major” 23 November 1998. 
  16costly.  For instance, rejecting a subordinate’s suggestion to use death threats against 
Baruch Ivcher, he said, “Remember why Pinochet had his problems.  We will not be so 
clumsy.  And, besides, what’s the purpose of ordering the death of anybody?  This is 
madness.”
19  Montesinos ran death squads, so this should be taken with a grain of salt, 
but perhaps he calculated that using violence excessively could be counterproductive.  If 
he threatened someone, others might become reluctant to transact with him.  He had other 
methods for enforcing agreements.     
Montesinos used the shadow of the future to create incentives for those he bribed.  
He commonly arranged his payments in monthly installments, under which defection was 
less likely than with a large one-shot payment.  The television-channel contract given in 
Appendix 1 stipulated that payments were to be made monthly and were to be backed by 
a letter of credit.  As another example, he told a public official to whom he had given a 
job, “Apart from the salary, that is ten or fifteen thousand soles, I am going to give you 
$10,000 monthly . . . You come here every month, I give you a little envelope and that’s 
it.  And then you do not have the economic problem.”
20       
It might have been expected that Montesinos would have all of the bargaining 
power, so he could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to squeeze out all the rents.  But he did 
not.  The videotapes show him haggling with the recipients of his largesse.  One example 
is his account of negotiating with a congressman to switch parties:  “I said: five. No, he 
said, I can’t do anything with five, I spend it in a week.  Twenty he wants monthly.  Now, 
I am not going to quibble, good, twenty then.”
21  Montesinos left some rents with the 
bribe-takers, perhaps so they would have an incentive to go on dealing with him.     
The need for enforcement mechanisms was mitigated by one general feature of all 
corrupt deals.  The very fact that an illicit deal has been done makes both parties 
dependent on each other, for either could denounce the other (Lamsdorff, 2002).  
Speaking of an opposition congressman, Montesinos said, “He is one of us, brother, he is 
                                                           
19 Audio CD 1289, 129A-B “Meeting with Dr. Congressman Carlos Ferrero” 31 December 1998.  
Jochamowitz 2002, p. 45. 
20 Videos 888-89, untitled, 3 May 1998 Jochamowitz 2002, p. 192. 
21  Audio B-139 A-4, untitled, undated.  Jochamowitz 2002, p. 163. 
  17committed.”  Referring to a member of the National Elections Board, he affirmed: “yes, 
he is with us… He has risked it a thousand times for us, a thousand and one.”
22   
  Montesinos created, then, a web of covert deals and mutual obligations.  How 
might a similar corrupt network elsewhere be destabilized?  Pro-democracy policy might 
focus on ways of upsetting the web of obligations.  Promising whistle-blowers immunity 
from prosecution and cash rewards, for example, could induce insiders to defect.  Which 
brings us back to the news media:  corrupt networks necessarily being covert, the media, 
with their threat of exposure, are their natural challengers.   
 
6.  The Cost of SIN 
 
  Does all of this matter?  Fujimori and Montesinos were justified in running Peru 
as they did, it has been argued. “Fujimori restored order, destroyed the Shining Path, and 
attained significant economic growth,” note Djankov et al. (2003a, p. 614).  He achieved 
these goals by “entrenching himself in power through Montesinos’ corrupt deals.  From 
the perspective of Peruvian institutions, these deals reflect a move to eliminate disorder 
and increase dictatorship, which was probably efficient.”  The view that Fujimori’s 
authoritarianism was efficient is questionable on both political and economic grounds. 
  The bribing of the judges, politicians, and news media described in this paper 
occurred in the lead-up to Fujimori’s campaign to be reelected for a third term, from 1998 
to 2000.  Fujimori’s outstanding achievement, restoring order by destroying the terrorists, 
followed the capture of Shining Path leader Guzmán in 1992.  The self-coup, which 
Fujimori argued was needed to give him extra antiterrorist powers, took place in 1992.  
Terrorist disorder had been eliminated before the events described here.  While Fujimori 
is credited with boosting Peru’s growth by ending inflation and opening up the economy, 
toward the end of his term growth fell.  From 1998 to 2000, it averaged just 1.2 percent.   
What political harm came from what Michnik calls the Montesinos virus?  “The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,” said 
James Madison, “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
23  The 
                                                           
22  Audio 352-A, no title, undated, and Audio 1196 “Joy Way Serpa and Bringas,” 14 August 1998.   
23  Federalist Paper No. 47 (Hamilton et al., 1961, p. 301). 
  18Fujimori regime, by stealth, accumulated all of these powers, plus power over the news 
media.  Political and economic freedom is reduced, according to the cross-country data of 
Djankov et al. (2003b), by government ownership of the media.  While Fujimori’s 
government did not own the media, it had control over them.   
Democracy can die, retrogressing into dictatorship.  The cross-country data show 
retrogression is associated with per capita income.  According to Przeworski et al. (2000, 
p. 98), in no country with per capita income above $10,000 (in 2000 purchasing-power-
parity US dollars), has democracy ever been replaced by autocracy.  Below this cutoff, 
there is a significantly positive probability of democracy dying.  With a per capita income 
of $4,600 in 2000, Peru by this calculation was well into the danger zone.  While Peru did 
not retrogress all the way into full dictatorship under Fujimori, it went much of the way 
and risked sliding further.   
  What is the economic harm from the Montesinos virus?  By corrupting the judges, 
Fujimori and Montesinos probably fettered Peru’s economy.  When judges are not 
immune from political interference, contracting becomes undependable.  For example, in 
1998 a US company, Newmont Mining Corporation, had a dispute with a French 
company, BGRM, over their joint ownership of a huge goldmine in the Andes.  The case 
made its way to the Supreme Court of Peru.  One vladivideo shows a Newmont vice 
president asking Montesinos to intervene with the Supreme Court; then another shows 
Montesinos leaning on one of the judges.
24  The judge complied and the court ruled for 
Newmont, requiring BGRM to sell its stake in the mine to Newmont at a court-set price.  
The cross-country evidence shows that, where judges decide cases not on their merits but 
under political pressure, property rights are insecure and firms are deterred from 
investing (Johnson et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2004).  In 2001, the year after Fujimori 
fell, the World Bank ran a survey of Peruvian managers asking about the obstacles to 
doing business (World Bank, 2001b, p. 9).  Of the managers polled, 72 percent said 
“uncertainty generated by the judiciary” was “a very serious obstacle.”    
  The effects of a corrupted judiciary have outlasted Fujimori.  It takes years to 
build a judiciary that is honest and perceived to be honest.  Ironically, respect for 
democracy, according to Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori’s successor as president, prevented 
                                                           
24  For more details, see McMillan and Zoido (2004).   
  19the new government from rooting out the corrupt judges.  Interviewed in 2004, Toledo 
said that, because of the “independence of all checks and balances” he had been unable to 
intervene in the judiciary to reform it.  “I cannot act like Fujimori, who shut down the 
judicial power and the Congress.  The law does not permit me to do anything.”
25 
  The news media also suffered damage.  In a 2001 poll, Peruvians were asked 
whether they agreed with the statement, “I trust the information that I read in 
newspapers.”  Just 16 percent said they completely agreed.
26  The lack of trust in news 
reporting is a concern, given the media’s role in constraining government power. 
 
7.  The Media as Watchdog 
 
  “If we do not control the television we do not do anything,” said General Elesván 
Bello at a 1999 meeting involving Montesinos, high-ranking members of the armed 
forces, and some television executives.
27  Demonstrating its power, it was television that 
finally toppled the Fujimori regime.  Following the broadcasting of the videotape of 
Montesinos bribing congressman Kouri, a flood of videotapes were aired, first on cable, 
then on nationwide broadcast.   
  The news media are the most potent of the democratic checks and balances.  This 
is our main conclusion.  Measured by the bribes Montesinos paid, the legislature and the 
judiciary are far less pressing constraints on the executive branch of government than 
television.  Those other checks and balances obtain their force via the threat of exposure 
to the citizens, and television gives widest exposure.  Our finding applies only to 1990s 
Peru, of course, but it may extrapolate to nascent democracies elsewhere.   
That the news media are the chief watchdog has implications for policy.  The 
checks and balances work as a system, so an independent judiciary and genuine political 
competition are needed.  But measures to safeguard the media’s independence from 
political influence and to ensure their credibility to the public are perhaps the crucial 
policies for shoring up democracy.  
                                                           
25  El País, “Interview with Alejandro Toledo, President of Peru,” February 25, 2004 
26  TGI Latina survey, reported at http://www.zonalatina.com/Zldata231.htm.  Other Latin American 
countries like Mexico and Venezuela also had low perceived news credibility. 
27  Video 1792, Meeting with the general commanders of the armed forces, the Winter brothers, Carlos 
Boloña Behr, and Vladimiro Montesinos, 26 November 1999.  Jochamowitz (2002). 
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These are typical receipts demanded by Montesinos.  Left:  a Supreme Court justice 
acknowledges being paid US$10,000.  Right:  a member of the National Electoral Board 
acknowledges being paid US$15,000. 
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  Montesinos counting out money for José Francisco Crousillat, the vice president 
  of América Televisión, Channel 4.  (From a vladivideo.) 
 
 












Money Contributed To The SIN By Other Public Agencies 
(in millions of US dollars) 
(Presented by Colonel Jose Villalobos Candela during his deposition on October 19, 2002 to 
the investigative congressional commission.) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 TOTAL
Ministry of Interior    3.0 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.4  18.4 
Ministry of Defense  4.4 6.0 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 2.8 7.7  40.4 
Peruvian Marines     0.3         0.3 
Peruvian Air Force     0.3         0.3 
Peruvian Army      0.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.0    7.2 
TOTAL  4.4 9.1 8.2 8.2 7.4 7.3 7.1 5.6 9.1  66.5 
Source: Informe Final de la Subcomision Investigadora de la Denuncia Constitucional No. 6 
available at: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/congresista/2001/destrada/denuncias/denuncia-
6.pdf. 
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Table 2: Political Capture 
 
Those who changed their party for Peru 2000 (Fujimori's party) 





José Luis Cáceres 
Velásquez  
FREPAP (Ataucusi)  $20,000   (?)+$50,000 (one-time) +$100,000 (one-
time)  
+Judicial favors 
Róger Cáceres Pérez   FREPAP (Ataucusi)  $20,000   
Ruby Rodríguez de Aguilar  APRA (Salinas)  $50,000  Judicial favors for her husband 
Jorge Polack Merel  PSN (Castañeda)  (??)  Vice President of the Foreign Relations 
Commission in Congress 
Juan Carlos Miguel 
Mendoza del Solar 
PSN (Castañeda)  $10,000   
Gregorio Ticona Gómez  PP (Toledo)  $10,000  $15,000 (signing bonus) +$20,000 (car) 
+$3,000 (apartment). Land deal in Titicaca 
Lake that would insure his reelection 
José Luis Elías Ávalos  A (Salas)  $15,000    +$40,000 ("campaign reimbursement") 
+$60,000 (continue campaigning) 
Antonio Palomo Orefice  PP (Toledo)  $20,000   
Mario Gonzáles Inga  PP (Toledo)  $20,000   
Alberto Kouri  PP (Toledo)   $15,000   
Edilberto Canales Pillaca  PP (Toledo)    Judicial favors 
Eduardo Farah  PSN (Castañeda)     
Those who did not change their party (informants or moles) 
Jorque D'Acunha Cuervas  PP (Toledo)  $10,000   
Waldo Enrique Ríos 
Salcedo 
FIM (Olivera)    $10,000 (one time payment) +Judicial help 
with the National Electoral Board 
Maria del Milagro Huamán  PP (Toledo)  $30,000   
José León Luna Gálvez  PSN (Castañeda)  $7,000   
Guido Pennano Allison  FIM (Olivera)  $15,000   ($30,000 Pinchi) +$20,000 (car) 
Members of Fujimori's party 
Rolando Reátegui  P00  $3,000   
Luz Salgado  P00  $20,000   
Carmen Lozada de Gamboa  P00  $20,000   
Manuel Vara Ochoa  P00  $20,000   
Martha Chavez Cossío de 
Ocampo 
P00  $20,000 
 
Sobero Taira  P00  $20,000   
Members of the executive 
Victor Joy Way  Prime Minister  $10,000    
Federico Salas  Prime Minister  $30,000   
Alberto Bustamante  Minister of Justice  $5,000   
Sources:  Informe Final de la Subcomisión Investigadora de la Denuncia Constitucional No. 6, at: 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/congresista/2001/destrada/denuncias/denuncia-6.pdf, Public deposition of Montesinos before this 
commission, at: http://www.agenciaperu.com/actualidad/2002/ene/vladi_com_estrada.htm, The transcript of the first video, 
where Montesinos hands $15,000 to Kouri is at La República, 15 September 2000, The source of Federico Salas confession is 
El Comercio, at: http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/ecespe/html/montesinos/montesinos_archivo1.html 
Notes:  Party affiliations are Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú (FREPAP),  Partido Aprista (APRA), Perú Posible (PP), 
Avancemos (A), Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM), Partido Solidaridad Nacional (PSN), Perú 2000 (P00).  Payments 
are monthly unless otherwise stated.   
(?) The source of this number is Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, Montesinos’s bookkeeper, not Montesinos.   
(??) Pinchi also claims that Polack received three payments on the amounts of '$80,000, $250,000, and $160,000.  When 
Montesinos was asked about this, he did not deny it but asked to be allowed not to talk about it in public because it concerned 
a "private matter."   
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Table 3:  Judicial Capture 
 




General Manager of the Judicial 
Power 
Ricardo Mendoza Torres 
(Montesinos' cousin) 




Justice in the National Elections 
Board 
Alipio Montes de Oca  $50,000   $15,000 
+$10,000 
Justice in the National Elections 
Board 
Luis Serpa Segura  $45,000   $10,000 
+$10,000 
+$10,000 
President of the Supreme Court  Victor Raul Castillo Castillo  $35,000   $10,000 
Supreme Justice  Luis Ortiz Bernardini  $25,000   $10,000 
President of the Superior Court  Pedro Infantes Mandujano  $24,000   $5,000 
+$3,000 
+$3,000 
Superior Justice  Raul Lorenzzi Goicochea  $25,000     
Justice in the Appeals Court  William Paco Castillo Castillo  $16,000   $10,000 
Supreme Justice, Provisional  Alejandro Rodriguez Medrano  $10,000   $5,000 
+$5,000 
+$10,000 
Supreme Justice  Carlos Saponara Miligan  $10,000   $5,000 
+$5,000 
Superior Justice in a local Court  Daniel Bedrinana Garcia  $2,500     
Judge Percy  Escobar  Lino  $10,000   $5,000 
+$5,000 
Judge  Fernando Aguirre Infante  $10,000     
Judge  Manuel Ruiz Cueto  $6,000     
Judge  William Ardiles Campos  $3,000     
Judge  Victor Martinez Candela  $3,000     
Judge Sonia  Pineda  $2,500     
Judge  Alminda Lopez Pizarro  $2,500     
Judge Willy  Herrera  Casina  $2,500     
Judge  Nicolas Trujillo López (Ivcher 
case) 
   $5,000 
President of the Public Law Court  Sixto Muñoz Sarmiento 
(Lucchetti and Ivcher cases) 
   $3,000 
+$3,000 
Others involved but without data on bribes: 
Supreme Court Justices: Orestes Castellares Camac, Eliana Salinas de Alencastre, Jorge Gonzales 
Campos, Arturo Chocano Polanco, Jose Pariona Pastrana, Caslos Alarcon del Portal, Wilber Villafuerte 
Mogollon, Juan Quespe Alcala, Luis Castro Reyes, Carlos Henriquez Clfer, Juan Miguel Ramos 
Lorenzo 
Judges: Segundo Sarria Carbajo, Carlos Alcantara Perez, Karina Sanchez Alarcon, Ricardo Nunez 
Espinoza, Arturo Vilchez Requejo, Jose Rios Olson. 
Source: Bresani (2003) and author calculations.  The list of the others’ involved come from Bresani (2003) and has been 
confirmed by several journalistic reports.   
Note: The data in the first column of bribes are from Bresani (2003).  The second column of bribe data is from a set of receipts 
like the ones reproduced in Figure 1 and that we collected from journalistic sources in Peru.  From the information available, 
the frequency of these payments is unclear.  It is probable that the data in Bresani (2003) aggregate the receipts, but Bresani 











America Television (Channel 4) Jose 
Francisco Crousillat 
$9,000,000 in a signed contract for $1,500,000 per 
month from November 1999 to April 2000, possibly 
more (C) 
$619,000 in October 1998, promised more monthly 
payments (C) (BH) 
Frequencia Latina (Channel 2) Samuel 
and Mendel Winter (owners after 
Baruch Ivcher exiled) 
$3,000,000 in a signed contract for $500,000 per month 
from November 1999 to April 2000, possibly more (R) 
$3,073,407 on December 1999 for an increase of capital 
that gave 27% of shares to Montesinos (R) 
Panamericanan Television (Channel 
5) Manuel Delgado Parker (brother of 
Genaro) and Ernest Schutz 
(shareholders) 
$9,000,000 contract agreed by Shutz and Montesinos on 
video 1783. In total Montesinos claims he handed 
$10,600,000 to Schutz (BH) 
$350,000 handed by Montesinos to Shutz, video 
screened by congress 10/02/01 (BH) 
Cable Canal De Noticias CCN (Cable 
Channel Network) Vicente Silva Checa 
(Video 1778) 
$2,000,000 for his shares in the CCN to the Ministry of 
Defense in November 1999 (C)  
Andina de Television (ATV)(Channel 
9) Julio Vera 
$50,000 to fire Cecilia Valenzuela and Luis Iberico (C) 
Red Global (Channel 13) Genaro 
Delgado Parker (borther of Manuel) 
In exchange business help and judicial favors, Delgado 








Expreso (mainstream newspaper) 
Eduardo Calmell del Solar (director and 
stockholder) 
$1,000,000 in two installments, to buy shares in the 
newspaper (C) and videos 1492, 1736, 1753 
El Tío, (Chicha/popular press) Jose 
Olaya Correa (owner and director)    
$1,500,000 between 1998 and 2000 (C) 
$3,000-$4,000 per headline, $5,000 for full coverage 
inside, $500 for smaller stories (C) 
La Chuchi (Chicha/popular press) 
Oliveri and Estenos (owners). 
$8,000 weekly, same press house as El Mañanero, 
Editora Americana) (B) 
El Chato, Rafael Document (founder) 
and Ruben Gamarra (director) out 
$1,000 each time it comes, small circulation, only comes 
out two to three days a week.  (B) 
  
Media Not Captured 
 
Newspapers: La República and El Comercio 
Magazine: Caretas 





Newspaper: El Peruano 
TV Channel: Televisión Nacional Peruana 
Radio Station: Radio Nacional 
Sources: (B) Bresani (2003), (BH) Bowen and Holligan (2003), (C) Conaghan (2002), (R) La República 
Feb 24, 2001. 
  28Appendix 1:  Example of a Compromiso de Honor 
 
 
COMMITMENT OF HONOR 
 
  The subscriber of this document GONZALEZ INGA, Mario, elected as 
Congressman of the Republic in the recent General Elections; with the present document 
renounces irrevocably being part of the Political Group “PERU POSIBLE”, in which list 
I participated as a candidate; and therein I recover my political independence, committing 
to support the political group “PERU 2000,” which I join for the five years of duration of 
my congressional duties, for which I will act in close collaboration with the bearer of this 
document, from whom I will directly receive instructions about these particulars.    
  In faith of which and as an expression of the Commitment of Honor that I 
voluntarily assume as of now, I subscribe in the city of Lima, the twenty second day of 
April of the year 2000. 
 
     MARIO  GONZALEZ  INGA   
       
 
 
Source:  Informe Final de la Subcomision Investigadora de la Denuncia Constitucional 
No. 6,  http://www.congreso.gob.pe/congresista/2001/destrada/denuncias/denuncia-6.pdf 
 
  29Appendix 2:  The contract between a television channel and Montesinos (denoted 
“the Contractor”)  
 
With the present document, the SERVICE PROVISION CONTRACT between one party, 
the “Compañía de Latinoamericana de Radio Difusion SA” (CHANNEL 2, 
FREQUENCIA LATINA), represented by its president and vice-president, Mr. Mendel 
Winter Zuzunaga  and Samuel Winter Zuzunaga, who will be referred herein for the 
effects of this contract only as “the Channel;” and the other party, “the Contractor.”  For 
reasons of strict confidentiality and with express consent from the Channel, the name and 
address of the Contractor are not specified; this does not however nullify the legal value 
of this document, in which the following terms and conditions are approved: 
 
FIRST:  The object of the present contact is to establish the rules according to which the 
Channel binds itself voluntarily to comply with the obligations specified in the fourth 
clause of this contract for the duration of its validity. 
 
SECOND:  To correspond what was established in the later clause the Channel will 
receive monthly and in advance from the Contractor the amount of FIVE HUNDRED 
THOUSAND AMERICAN DOLLARS (US$500,000), an amount that will be delivered 
within four workdays of the end of each month and for which a receipt will be signed, 
with exception of the first monthly payment, to be paid when this contract is signed.   
 
THIRD: The present contract will be valid from the date of this document and it will end 
on 9 April, 2000, and it could be renewed with common agreement of the parties, in 
which case the rules that guide it will be establish at that time. 
 
FOURTH:  The duties of the Channel from the moment this contract is valid are: 
 
•  Not to admit nor pass any political propaganda direct or indirectly, unless the 
Contractor so asks. 
•  Not to broadcast any political advertisement of any sort from the presidential 
candidates, the Congress, or any other public office for the 2000 campaign, unless 
the Contractor so requests explicitly. 
•  Not to promote directly or indirectly the image of any political group, party, or 
political movement nor of its leaders or representatives, without the written 
approval of the Contractor. 
•  Not to broadcast any interview, debates, or reports from presidential candidates 
and/or congressional candidates without the written approval of the Contractor. 
•  Not to show any other program whose contents refer explicitly or implicitly to 
political issues without these being accepted and/or approved by the Contractor 
•  To schedule news programs at their usual time from Monday to Saturday; content 
and headlines will be coordinated and approved by the Contractor. 
•  To review daily with the Contractor the contents of all headlines and all news 
programs before they air at the national level, to incorporate the observations that 
the Contractor may deem necessary and also to include the themes that he might 
decide for those news programs. 
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•  To give the Contractor the necessary time to develop the contents and headlines 
for the Sunday program “Contra Punto,” the execution of which the Channel is 
charged with. 
•  To be responsible for any declarations that its staff makes through other news 
media, television channels, or radio stations, that are not in accordance with the 
spirit of this contract. 
•  To meet the Contractor as many times as necessary to coordinate the fulfillment 
of what is established in this contract. 
 
FIFTH: The duties of the Contractor are: 
 
•  To fulfill dutifully the payments here agreed. 
•  To coordinate with the Channel the review of all news programs and the Sunday 
program “Contra Punto.” 
•  To do whatever else is necessary. 
 
SIXTH: As a warranty, the Channel will sign a letter of credit to the bearer for the 
monthly amount that they receive with a date of expiration of 30 days.  Once this 
monthly payment is cancelled, it will be burned and renewed with a new one in the same 
conditions until the end of this contract. 
 
SEVENTH: Failure to comply with any of these clauses will lead to the following 
punishments: 
 
•  The Contractor will pay the Channel 1 percent of the monthly payment each day 
payment is late, until the first seven days, after which this will increase to 5 
percent until its cancellation. 
•  If the Channel fails to act as is agreed here, the Contractor may through written or 
verbal communication request that corrective action be taken.  In the event that 
the failure is repeated, the Contractor will be permitted to resolve the contract 
without the Channel having any right to complain in any way.  
 
EIGHTH:  The Contractor may at any point in the duration of this contract veto the 
participation of any commentator or journalist in the Channel. 
 
NINTH: The parties, in accordance with what is agreed here, sign this contract, in a 
single copy that will be held by the Contractor. 
 
In Lima, November 6, 1999.   
 
 
Source:  La República, February 24, 2001  
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